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A Rose By Any Other Name Still Has Thorns That Cut You
Some Things To Consider. . .
What do we mean by communication? Is the act of understanding a space-time
event? What is the ultimate difference between a symbol and a sign? Is a symbol
reducible to matter and energy? Doesn't language come down to abstraction? What is
the difference between a concrete concept and an abstract concept? Is everything what
we think it is? Is reality a subjective creation of the mind of the individual, or is some
part of reality subjectively interpreted while there exists an objective reality not
dependent on our interpretation? When you think in your mind are you speaking to
yourself? Do you always think in words? Can you think without words? Do you think
that one can be taught to love wisdom or learning? If we reinterpret the past in terms
of the present, how do we know the difference between reality and dreams when we
look back? How does the intellect detach itself from reality? Do we receive reality
through the intellect or through the senses? Does communication unify people? What
do metaphors do?

The Mystery of Language
Excerpts from Walker Percy

The significance of language may be approached in the following way. In our
ordinary theoretical view of the world, we see it as a process, a dynamic succession of
energy states. There are subatomic particles and atoms and molecules in motion; there
are gaseous bodies expanding or contracting; there are inorganic elements in chemical
interaction; there are organisms in contact with an environment, responding and
adapting accordingly; there are animals responding to each other by means of sign
behavior.
A sign is something that directs our attention to something else. If you or I or a dog
or a cicada hears a clap of thunder, we will expect rain and seek cover. It will be seen
at once that this sort of sign behavior fits in very well with the explanatory attitude
mentioned above. The behavior of a man or animal responding to a natural sign
(thunder) or an artificial sign (Pavlov's buzzer) can be explained readily as a series of

space-time events which take place because of changes in the brain brought about by
past association.
But what is a symbol? A symbol does not direct our attention to something else, as
a sign does. It does not direct at all. It "means" something else. It somehow comes to
contain within itself the thing it means. The word ball is a sign to my dog and a
symbol to you. If I say ball to my dog, he will respond like a good Pavlovian
organism and look under the sofa and fetch it. But if I say ball to you, you sill simply
look at me and, if you are patient, finally say, "What about it?" The dog responds to
the word by looking for the thing; you conceive the ball through the word ball.
Now we can, if we like, say that the symbol is a kind of sign, and that when I say
the word ball, the sound strikes your ear drum, arrives in your brain, and there calls
out the idea of a ball. Modern semioticists do, in fact, try to explain a symbol as a kind
of sign. But this doesn't work. As Susanne Langer has observed, this leaves out
something, and this something is the most important thing of all.
The thing that is left out is the relation of denotation. The word names something.
The symbol symbolizes something. Symbolization is qualitatively different form sign
behavior; the thing that distinguishes man is his ability to symbolize his experience
rather than simply respond to it. The word ball does all the things the psychologist
says it does, makes its well-known journey from tongue to brain. But it does
something else too: it names the thing.
When I name an unknown thing or hear the name from you, a remarkable thing
happens. In some sense or other, the thing is said to "be" its name or symbol. The
semanticists are right: this round thing is certainly not the word ball. Yet unless it
becomes, in some sense or another, the word ball in our consciousness, we will never
know the ball. Cassirer's thesis was that everything we know we know through
symbolic media, whether words, pictures, formulae, or theories. As Mrs. Langer put
it, symbols are the vehicles of meaning.
But when a man appears and names a thing, when he says this is water and water is
cool, something unprecedented takes place. What the third term, man, does Is not
merely enter into interaction with the others-though he does this too--but stand apart
form two of the terms and say that one "is" the other. The two things which he pairs or
identifies are the word he speaks or hears and the thing he sees before him.
This is not only an unprecedented happening; it is also, as the semanticists have
noted, scandalous. A is clearly not B. But were it not for this cosmic blunder, man
would not be man; he would never be capable of folly and he would never be capable

of truth. Unless he says that A is B. he will never know A or B; he will only respond
to them.
To summarize: Science characteristically issues in assertions. But that which
science asserts is not itself an assertion but a space-time event. Science asserts that
matter is in interaction, that there are energy exchanges, that organisms respond to an
environment, etc. But the assertion itself is a pairing of elements, a relation which is
not a space-time event but a kind of identity asserted by an assertor.
All of the space-time events mentioned in connection with the production of speech
do occur, and without them there would be no language. But language is something
else besides these events. This does not mean that language cannot be understood but
that we must use another frame of reference and another terminology.

Highlights from the last meeting. . .
Memories. Over time you start to forget things. You reinterpret the past in terms of
the present moment, as opposed to recalling the past as it actually was. How do you
know that you remember the truth? How do you know the difference between dreams
and reality? How you remember things is a part of your personality and experiences.
What do we mean by communication? Do we mean only the transfer of information
from one mind to another, or is it something more than that? Does the act of
communicating entail a transfer of more than just data, conveying also ideas and
emotions?
Evolutionarily speaking, is what humanity does with language and thought merely
quantitatively more advanced than animals, or is there a qualitative difference
between them? If the difference is only defined in terms of quantity, then animal
thought could conceivable evolve to the equal status of human thought. Could this be
true if the difference is qualitative? If the qualitative difference is a result of a critical
mass reached through the quantitative accumulation, then an animal could reach
human terms through mere increase of intelligence. K Could the qualitative difference
be seen in terms of something else?
What is the qualitative difference between realizing the presence of danger and
understanding Plato? In the one a response happens, in the other no physical response

is required. And animal can recognize and react to danger, but does this reaction grow
from an understanding of its mortality or from instinct? Animals have no
understanding of the words "cause and effect." They have acquired cause-effect
associations in their behavioral responses, but they don't know this. People see things
in terms of abstract
concepts and metaphysical ideals. A human can conceptualize the perfect rose and
compare any rose that they see with that ideal; whereas an animal sees only the
particular rose before them (if indeed an animal distinguishes flowers form other
forms of plants).
Can there be thought without language? Does language allow thought, or can
thought occur without a preexisting language? If you don't have a pre-existing
language, does your mind create symbols with which you come to understand and
contemplate the world? Does language affect the way you think? Do you always think
in words, in effect "talking to yourself" or do you think in terms of emotion and action
without a formal system adequate to communicate your thoughts to others?

Can Desire be Taught?
Can emotion be instilled? Can you be taught to love something? Is what you love a
result of the experiences you have had, or is there an element of free will in what you
desire? Can you control your own desires? Can you cause someone to love you? If
you could, would that love mean as much to you as it would if they chose to love you?
Would you really be able to call it "love"?
Where does the desire for learning come from? You can teach a student math, but
can you teach him or her to desire to pursue it further? Can you teach somebody to
love math for its own sake?
You can instill in someone the desire to acquire or avoid consequences of doing
something, but what about the desire for the sake of the object itself? E.g., you can
force a child to do his or her homework by offering reward or punishment, but how do
you make a child desire to do homework for the sake of learning?

Announcements
Join us for a Social Gathering on Saturday, November lye at 7:30 p.m. Costumes are
optional (but encouraged. . .). Dinner will be covered dish; please let us know what
you will be bringing.

Fall Meeting Schedule
All meetings, held at 8:30 p.m. in Gamble Hall, room 106, are free and open
to everyone. Wednesday. . .
October 8 & 22
November 5 & 19
Look for the
Philosophical Debate
table on AASU DayOctober 9th
We have several activities planned for this year, among which are sponsoring the 2nd
annual Philosophical Essay Contest, sponsoring a speaker in the Spring, and hosting
social gatherings. If you would like to help with fund-raisers, or would like to make a
donation, please contact us.
The Thought Box is located in The Writing Center, Gamble Hall, room 109. It is
there for convenient submission to The Philosopher's Stone, suggestions for future
topics, requests to be on our mailing list, or any thoughts that you would like to share
with us.
Submissions to The Philosopher's Stone may address any philosophical issue,
compare philosophical ideas, propose new topics for discussion, or address any
previous newsletter article or topic. Works must be 250 words or less and include
name and phone number.

Faculty Advisor: Dr. Erik Nordenhaug, 921-7322.
Student President: Tiffanie L.C. Rogers. 1-888-964-9543 (punch in your # at the
beep).

